Abstract. This work presents a new framework for Privacy-Preserving Investment systems in a distributed model. In this model, independent investors can transfer funds to independent projects, in the same way as it works on crowdfunding platforms. The framework protects the investors' single payments from being detected (by any other party), only the sums of each investor's payments are revealed (e.g to the system). Likewise, the projects' single incoming payments are concealed and only the final sums of the incoming payments for every project are revealed. In this way, no other party than the investor (not even the system administration) can detect how much she paid to any single project. Though it is still possible to confidentially exchange any part of an investment between any pair of investors, such that market liquidity is unaffected by the system. On top, our framework allows a privacy-preserving return of a multiple of all the held investments (e.g. interest payments or dividends) to the indivdual investors while still revealing nothing else than the sum of all returns for every investor. We provide reasonable security guarantees for this framework that are based on common notions from the Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMPC) literature. As an instantiation for this framework we present Investcoin. This is a proper combination of three cryptographic protocols, namely a Private Stream Aggregation scheme, a Commitment scheme and a Range test and it is usable in connection with any existing currency. The security of the three protocols is based on the DDH assumption. Thus, by a composition theorem from the SMPC literature, the security of the resulting Investcoin protocol is also based on the DDH assumption. Furthermore, we provide a simple decentralised key generation protocol for Investcoin that supports dynamic join, dynamic leave and fault-tolarance of investors and moreover achieves some security guarantees against malicious investors.
Introduction
The promise of performance benefit by using technologies like online-outsourcing and cloud-computing goes along with the loss of control over individual data. Therefore the public awareness of data protection increases. We use encryption and privacy technologies to protect our electronic messages, our consumer behaviour or patient records. In this work, we put the following question up for discussion: why is there only minor attention paid to the protection of sensitive financial data in the public? Indeed the requirement to trust in financial institutes may be an obstacle for the trade secrecy of companies. On the one hand, transactions on organised markets are registered by electronic systems, audited and eventually get under the control of the system administration (e.g. it can refuse a transaction). In some cases this is desired: e.g. it should be possible to detect a company financing criminal activities. On the for the existence of secure PSA schemes, based on key-homomorphic weak PRFs. Investcoin is not a classical cryptocurrency. It can be thought of as a cryptographic layer on top of any currency used for investments, similar to what Zerocoin is intended to be for Bitcoin. Bitcoin is the first cryptocurrency, introduced by Satoshi Nakamoto [17] . Currently it is the cryptocurrency with the largest market capitalisation. Bitcoin is as a peer-to-peer payment system where transactions are executed directly between users without interaction of any intermediate party. The transactions are verified by the users of the network and publicly recorded in a blockchain, a distributed database. Zerocoin was proposed by Miers et al. [16] as an extension for Bitcoin (or any other cryptocurrency) providing cryptographic anonymity to recorded transactions in the blockchain (Bitcoin itself provides only pseudonymity). This is achieved by the use of a seperate mixing procedure based on Commitment schemes. Therefore particular transactions cannot be publicly traced back to particular Bitcoin adresses anymore. This is also the main principle of a PPI system: no investment in a particular project can be traced back to a particular investor. In this regard Investcoin has similarities with Zerocoin. Methods for market regulation through aggregated privacy-preserving risk reporting were studied by Abbe et al. [1] . They constructed protocols allowing a number of users to securely compute aggregated risk measures based on summations and inner products. Flood et al. [12] considered balancing transparency and confidentiality for financial regulation by investigating cryptographic tools for statistical data privacy.
Preliminaries
In this section we provide the description of our investment model, the basic protocols underlying Investcoin and their corresponding security definitions.
Model
As initial situation we consider a network consisting of n investors and λ projects to be funded by the investors. As an analogy from the real world one can think of a crowdfunding platform or an exchange system where projects or companies try to collect funds from various individual investors. Each investor N i , i " 1, . . . , n, is willing to invest the amount x i,j ě 0 to the project P j , j " 1, . . . , λ, thus the total amount invested by N i is ř λ j"1 x i,j and the total amount received by project P j is ř n i"1 x i,j . Moreover, there exists an administration (which may be the administration of the crowdfunding platform). The investors and the project managements are not required to trust the administration. We consider a series of investment rounds. An investment round denotes the moment when the payments of all participating investors are registered by the administration of the system. From round to round the values n and λ may change, i.e. investors and projects may join or leave the network before any round. After an investment round is over and the time comes to give a return to the investors (i.e. at maturity), the management of each project P j publishes some value α j defining the return for each investor (i.e. an indicator of economic growth, interest yield, dividend yield or similar). The untrusted system administration (or simply system) serves as a pool for the distribution of investments to the projects and of returns to the investors: first, for all i " 1, . . . , n it collects the total amount ř λ j"1 x i,j invested by investor N i and rearranges the union of the total amounts into the aggregated investment ř n i"1 x i,j for project P j for all j " 1, . . . , λ; at maturity date, for all j " 1, . . . , λ it collects the total returns α j ř n i"1 x i,j of the projects and rearranges the union of the total returns into the returns ř λ j"1 α j x i,j of the investors. While the investors do not have to trust each other nor the system (i.e. an investor doesn't want the others to know her financial data), we consider a honest-but-curious model where the untrusted system administration tries to compromise investors to build a coalition. This coalition tries to infer additional information about uncompromised investors, but under the constraint of honestly following the investment protocol. On the other hand, we allow investors that are not part of the coalition, to execute some malicious behaviour, that we will concretise later. Thereby we have the following objectives in each investment round: Security -Hiding: For all i " 1, . . . , n the only financial data of investor N i (if uncompromised) known to the system is C i " ř λ j"1 x i,j and E i "
. . , λ the only financial data of project P j known to the system is X j " ř n i"1 x i,j and α j . Particularly, the single investments of N i to P 1 , . . . , P λ should remain concealed.
-Binding: Investors may not announce an incorrect investment, i.e. if N i has send x i,j to P j , then P j should also receive x i,j from N i . -For all i, j it holds that x i,j ě 0, i.e. no investor can 'steal' money from a project.
Correctness
-For all i, if C i is the real aggregate of N i 's investments, then C i " ř λ j"1 x i,j , the system knows C i and can charge the bank account of N i with amount C i . -For all j, if X j is the real aggregate of P j 's funds, then X j " ř n i"1 x i,j , the system knows X j and transfers the amount X j to the bank account of P j .
-For all i, if E i is the real aggregate of N i 's returns, then E i " ř λ j"1 α j x i,j , the system knows E i and transfers the amount E i to the bank account of N i .
-If one of these conditions is violated (e.g. on the purpose of stealing money), then the injured party should be able to detect this fact and to prove it to the network latest after the end of the corresponding investment round. Now we provide the building blocks for a scheme satisfying these objectives.
Private Stream Aggregation
In this section, we define Private Stream Aggregation (PSA) and provide a security definition. The notion of PSA was introduced by Shi et al. [23] .
The definition of Private Stream Aggregation.
A PSA scheme is a protocol for safe distributed time-series data transfer which enables the receiver (here: the system administrator) to learn nothing else than the sums ř n i"1 x i,j for j " 1, 2, . . ., where x i,j is the value of the ith participant in (time-)step j and n is the number of participants (here: investors). Such a scheme needs a key exchange protocol for all n investors together with the administrator as a precomputation, and requires each investor to send exactly one message (namely the amount to spend for a particular project) in each step j " 1, 2, . . .. 
Definition 1 (Private
The system parameters pp are public and constant for all t j with the implicit understanding that they are used in Σ. Every investor encrypts her amounts x i,j with her own secret key s i and sends the ciphertext to the administrator. If the administrator receives the ciphertexts of all investors for some t j , it can compute the aggregate of the investors' data using the decryption key s 0 . While in [23] , the t j P T were considered to be time-steps within a time-series (e.g. for analysing time-series data of a smart meter), in our work the t j P T are associated with projects P j , j " 1, . . . , λ, to be funded in a particular investment round. Encryption queries are made only for i P U , since knowing the secret key for all i R U the adversary can encrypt a value autonomously. If encryption queries in time-step t j˚w ere allowed, then no deterministic scheme would be secure. The adversary T can determine the original data of all i R U , since it knows ps i q iRU . Then T can compute the sum ř iPU x i,j " PSADec s0 pt j , c 1,j , . . . , c n,j q´ř iRU x i,j of the uncompromised investors' values. If there is an investor's cipher which T does not receive, then it cannot compute the sum for the corresponding t j . It is also possible to define AO in the non-adaptive model as in [25, 24] : here an adversary may not compromise investors adaptively, but has to specify the coalition U of compromised investors before making any query.
Security of

Feasibility of AO.
In the random oracle model we can achieve AO for some constructions [23, 2, 25] . Because of its simplicity and efficient decryption, we use the PSA scheme proposed in [25] and present it in Figure 1 . It achieves AO based on the DDH assumption.
PSA scheme
Setup:
The public parameters are a primes q ą m¨n, p " 2q`1 and a hash function H : T Ñ QR p 2 modelled as a random oracle. The secret keys are s0, . . . , sn ÐR Zpq with ř n i"0 si " 0 mod pq. PSAEnc: For tj P T and i " 1, . . . , n, encrypt xi,j P r´m, ms by ci,j Ð p1`p¨xi,j q¨Hptj q s i mod p 2 . PSADec: For tj P T and ciphers c1,j, . . . , cn,j compute Vj P t1´p¨mn, . . . , 1`p¨mnu with
and compute ř n i"1 xi,j " pVj´1q{p over the integers (this holds if the ci,j are encryptions of the xi,j). The scheme proposed in [23] is similar to the one in Figure 1 , but is inefficient, if the range of possible decryption outcomes in is super-polynomially large in the security parameter. The scheme in Figure 1 also achieves the non-adaptive version of AO in the standard model.
Commitment schemes
A Commitment scheme allows a party to publicly commit to a value such that the value cannot be changed after it has been committed to (binding) and the value itself stays hidden to other parties until the owner reveals it (hiding). For the basic definitions we refer to [4] and [6] . Here we just recall the Pedersen Commitment introduced in [19] (Figure 2 ), which is computationally binding under the dlog assumption and perfectly hiding. In Section 3 we will combine the Pedersen Commitment with the PSA scheme from Figure 1 for the construction of Investcoin and thereby consider the input data x " x i,j to the Commitment scheme as investment amounts from investor N i to project P j . An essential property for the construction of Investcoin is that the Pedersen Commitment contains a homomorphic commitment algorithm, i.e. Com pk px, rq˚Com pk px 1 , r 1 q " Com pk px`x 1 , r`r 1 q.
Commitment scheme
GenCom: ppp, pkq Ð GenComp1 κ q, with public parameters pp describing a cyclic group G of order q and public key pk " ph1, h2q for two generators h1, h2 of G. (where dlog h 1 ph2q is not known to the commiting party). Com: For x P Zq choose r ÐR Zq and compute com " Com pk px, rq " h x 1¨h r 2 P G.
Unv:
For pk " ph1, h2q, commitment com and opening px, rq it holds that 
Range test
To allow the honest verifier to verify in advance, that the (possibly malicious) prover commits to a an integer x in a certain range, a Range test must be applied. Range tests were studied in [5, 7, 20, 21] . For Investcoin, an interactive procedure can be applied. It is a combination of the Pedersen Commitment to the binary representation of x and the extended Schnorr proof of knowledge [22] (Figure 3 ) applied to proving knowledge of one out of two secrets as described by Cramer [10] . Its basic idea was described by Boudot [5] . By the interactive procedure from Figure 4 , the prover shows to the verifier, that the commited value x lies in the interval r0, 2 l´1 s without revealing anything else about x. For the security of the construction in Figure 3 we refer to [10] , where a more general protocol was considered (particularly the special honest verifier zeroknowledge property is needed). We use the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [11] to make the Range test non-interactive.
Extended Schnorr Proof of Knowledge
Let G be a cyclic group of order q and h a generator of G. The prover wants to show to the verifier that she knows the discrete logarithms of either R " h r or S " h s without revealing its value and position. W.l.o.g. the prover knows r.
Com:
The prover chooses random v2, w2, z1 ÐR Zq and sends a1 " h z 1 , a2 " h w 2¨S´v2 to the verifier.
Chg:
The verifier sends a random v ÐR Zq to the prover. Opn: The prover sends v1 " v´v2, w1 " z1`v1r, v2 and w2 to the verifier. Chk: The verifier verifies that v " v1`v2 and that h 
Secure Computation
Our security definition for Investcoin will be twofold. In the first part, we consider a honest-but-curious coalition consisting of the untrusted system administration together with its compromised investors and the group of honest investors. Here we refer to notions from Secure Multi-Party Computation (SMPC). In the second part, we identify reasonable malicious behaviour that an investor could possibly execute and show, how the system can be secured against such malicious investors.
In this Section we focus on defining security against the honest-but-curious coalition. This definition follows standard notions from SMPC (as in [13] ) and is adapted to our environment: first, we consider two-party protocols where each party consists of multiple individuals (each individual in a party has the same goals) and second, we do not consider security of the coalition against the group, since the system administration has no input and thus its security against honest-but-curious investors is trivial. Rather we will later consider its security against malicious investors. Since Investcoin is the combination of various protocols, we will prove the security of these protocols separately and then use the composition theorem by Canetti [8] . 
Investcoin
In this section, we introduce Investcoin. This protocol is build from a combination of the PSA scheme from Figure 1 , the homomorphic Commitment scheme from Figure   2 and the Range test from Figure 4 . Moreover, we provide a simple key-generation protocol for the Investcoin protocol that allows the dynamic join and leave of investors and is fault-tolerant towards investors.
Construction of Investcoin
The DIESet algorithm in Figure 5 executes the Setup algorithms of the underlying schemes. Additionally, DIESet generates a verification parameter β j for each project P j (and an additional β 0 -this will be used for the security against malicious investors) which is only known to the system administration. In Section 3.2 we provide a simple protocol for generating the secrets. The encryption algorithm DIEEnc executes the encryption algorithm of Σ and encrypts the amounts invested by N i into P j . In order to prove that C i " ř λ j"1 x i,j , the N i execute the commitment algorithm DIECom commiting to the amounts x i,j invested using the randomness r i,j by executing the commitment algorithm of Γ and encrypting the r i,j with Σ. The Range test algorithm DIETes ensures that the investments are larger or equal 0. The payment verification algorithm DIEUnvPay first verifies that the combination of the commited amounts in the correct order is valid for the same combination of amounts encrypted in the correct order by executing the verification algorithm of Γ . If the investor has not cheated, this verification will output 1 by the homomorphy of Γ and the fact that
The DIEUnvPay algorithm verifies that the combination of commitments is valid for the aggregate C i of the investments of N i . The decryption algorithm DIEDec then decrypts the aggregated amounts for every project by executing the decryption algorithm of Σ. After the projects are realised, each investor N i should receive back a multiple α j x i,j of her amount invested in each project P j (e.g. a ROI). The factor α j is publicly released by the management of project P j and denotes a rate of return, interest or similar. This value is equal for every investor, since only the investor's stake should determine how much her profit from that project is. If the first check in the DIEUnvPay algorithm has output 1, the return verification algorithm DIEUnvRet verifies that the combination of commitments and return factors is valid for the claimed aggregate E i of the returns to receive by N i . We emphasize the low communication effort needed after the DIESet algorithm: every investor sends the messages for DIEEnc, DIECom, DIETes and DIEUnvPay in one shot to the system, later only the messages for DIEUnvRet have to be sent. Thus, there are only two rounds of communication between the investors and the system.
Theorem 2 (Correctness of Investcoin)
Let Ω be the protocol in Figure 5 . Then the following properties hold. j " 1, . . . , λ and x 1,j , . . . , x n,j P r0, ms: i " 1, . . . , n and x i,1 , . . . , x i,λ P r0, ms:
For all
DIEDec sk0 pt j , DIEEnc sk1 pt j , x 1,j q, . . . , DIEEnc skn pt j , x n,j" n ÿ i"1 x i,j .
DIEUnvPay pk˜λ ź j"1 com i,j , λ ÿ j"1 x i,j , λ ÿ j"1 r i,j¸" 1 ôD pc i,1 , . . . ,c i,λ q : pcom i,j ,c i,j q Ð DIECom pk,ski px i,j , r i,j q @ j " 1, . . . , λ.
Investcoin
Let κ be a security parameter and n, λ P N with n " polypκq and λ " polypκq. Let Σ " pSetup, PSAEnc, PSADecq be the PSA scheme from Figure 1 and let Γ " pGenCom, Com, Unvq be the Commitment scheme from Figure 2 . We define Investcoin Ω " pDIESet, DIEEnc, DIECom, DIETes, DIEUnvPay, DIEDec, DIEUnvRetq as follows.
DIESet:
-The system generates public parameters pp " tq, p, Hu with primes q ą m¨n, p " 2q`1 (where m " 2 l´1 is the maximum possible amount to invest into a single project by a single investor), parameters T " tt0, t1,t1, . . . , t λ ,t λ u and a hash function H : T Ñ QR p 2 .
-The system and the investors together generate secret keys s0 and ski " psi,siq ÐR ZpqˆZpq for all i " 1, . . . , n with s0 "´ř -The system generates a public key pk " ph1, h2q P Zp 2ˆZp2 with ordph1q " ordph2q " pq. DIEEnc: For all j " 1, . . . , λ, each investor Ni chooses xi,j P r0, ms and xi,0 " 0 and for all j " 0, . . . , λ Ni sends the following ciphers to the system:
DIECom: For all j " 1, . . . , λ, each Ni chooses ri,j ÐR r0, ms and sends the following to the system: pcomi,j,ci,j q Ð DIECom pk,sk i pxi,j, ri,j q " pCom pk pxi,j , ri,j q, PSAEncs i ptj , ri,j qq.
DIETes: For all j " 1, . . . , λ the algorithm from Figure 4 on pxi,j , ri,j q is executed between the system (verifier) and each investor Ni (prover) using pk. 
Proof. The first correctness property is given by the correctness of the PSA scheme from Figure 1 . The second and third correctness properties are given by the correctness and the homomorphy of the Commitment scheme from Figure 2 .
[ \ By the first property, the decryption of all ciphers results in the sum of the amounts they encrypt. So the projects receive the correct investments. By the second property, the total investment amount of each investor is accepted by the system if the investor has commited to it. Thus, the investor's account will be charged with the correct amount. By the third property, the total return to each investor is accepted by the system if the investor has commited to the corresponding investment amount before. Thus, the investor will receive the correct return on investment (ROI).
Generation of public parameters and secret key generation protocol
In this section, we show how the system sets the random oracle H : T Ñ QR p 2 and we provide a decentralised key generation protocol for Investcoin. It supports dynamic join, dynamic leave and fault-tolarance of investors using one round of communication between the investors. In the Section 4.2, we will show how to use the public parameters and the secret key generation protocol for the security of Investcoin.
Setting the random oracle. Recall that we need to generate public parameters, a random oracle H : T Ñ QR p 2 pHpt λ q, Hpt λ q, β λ q " pHpt λ´1 q, Hpt λ´1 q,´1´β λ´1 q, instructs each investor N i to set x i,λ´1 " x i,λ " 0 and sets α λ´1 " α λ " 1. In this way Equation (1) is satisfied. The projects P λ´1 , P λ deteriorate to 'dummy-projects' (e.g. if any investor decides to set x i,λ ą 0, then the system simply collects X λ ą 0). N i 1 obtains the shares s 1,i 1 , . . . , s n, 
By the secret sharing property this is a secure key generation protocol in the sense that only N i knows s i for all i " 1, . . . , n and only the system knows s 0 . For key generation, each investor has to send one message to every other investor and one message to the system which makes n 2 messages for the total network. As a drawback, note that the key of each single investor is controlled by the other investors together with the system: for example, if N 1 , . . . , N n´1 (maliciously) send the shares s 1,n , . . . , s n´1,n and s n,1 , . . . , s n,n´1 to the system, it can compute the entire key s n of N n . Assume that before the start of an arbitrary investment round, new investors want to join the network or some investors want to leave the network or some investors fail to send the required ciphers. In order to be able to carry out the protocol execution, the network can make a key update that requires Opnq messages (rather than Opn 2 q messages for a new key setup) using the established secret sharing scheme. Due to space limitations, we omit the (simple) details.
Security of Investcoin
Definition of security
The administration is honest-but-curious and may compromise investors to build a coalition for learning the values of uncompromised investors. Investors who are not in the coalition may try to execute the following (reasonable) malicious behaviour:
1. Use different values for x i,j in DIEEnc and DIECom in order to have a larger profit than allowed. 2. Invest negative amounts x i,j ă 0 in order to 'steal' funds from the projects. 3. Use different parameters than generated in the Setup-phase (i.e. send inconsistent or simply random messages) in order to distort the whole computation.
Definition 4 (Privacy-Preserving Investment system) Let κ be a security parameter and n, λ P N with n " polypκq and λ " polypκq. A protocol Ω " pDIESet, DIEEnc, DIECom, DIETes, DIEUnvPay, DIEDec, DIEUnvRetq consisting of ppt algorithms and executed between a group of honest parties of size u ď n and a coalition of honestbut-curious adversaries of size n´u`1 is a Privacy-Preserving Investment (PPI) system if the following properties hold.
Let f Ω be the deterministic functonality computed by Ω.
Then Ω performs a secure computation (according to Definition 3). 
Ω provides
The probability is over the choice of For all i " 1, . . . , n and j " 1, . . . , λ: 
The definition is twofold: on the one hand it covers the security of honest investors against a honest-but-curious coalition consisting of the untrusted system administration and compromised investors (Property 1) and on the other hand it covers the security of the system against maliciously behaving investors (Properties 2, 3, 4) . Note that we have to distinguish between these two requirements, since we assume different behaviours for the two groups of participants, i.e. we cannot simply give a real-world-ideal-world security proof as in the SMPC literature in the malicious model. Instead, we follow the notions of the SMPC literature [13] for the security of honest investors (only) in the honest-but-curious model and additionally provide security notions against some reasonably assumable behaviour of malicious investors. For the security against a honest-but-curious coalition, the first property ensures that from the outcome of the decryption no other information than X j can be detected for all j " 1, . . . , λ and that the single amounts comitted to by the investors for payment and return are hidden. For the security of the system against maliciously behaving investors, imagine the situation where an investor N i claims to having payed amount x i,j to project P j (in the DIECom algorithm) but in fact has only payedx i,j ă x i,j (in the DIEEnc algorithm). If the return factor α j is larger than 1, then N i would unjustly profit more from her investment than she actually should and the system would have a financial damage.
1 Therefore the second property says that for all i " 1, . . . , n with overwhelming probability, whenever x i,1 , . . . , x i,λ were send by N i using the DIEEnc algorithm and DIEUnvPay, DIEUnvRet accept C i , E i respectively, then C i and E i must be the legitimate amounts that N i respectively has invested in total and has to get back as return in total. The third property ensures that no investor is able to perform a negative investment. The fourth property ensures that all investors use the correct parameters as generated by the DIESet algorithm. 
Proof of security
First, we concentrate on the security against the honest-but-curious coalition (Property 1) and then show security against malicious investors (Propertis 2, 3, 4) .
Theorem 3
By the DDH assumption in the group QR p 2 of quadratic residues modulo p 2 for a safe prime p, Investcoin is a PPI system in the random oracle model.
Proof. The proof follows from Lemma 7, Lemma 8, Lemma 9 and Lemma 10 below.
[ \ Security against honest-but-curious coalition. Investcoin is the combination of the protocols described in Figures 1, 2, 3 . 3 We first show the security of these protocols seperately and then use Theorem 1 in order to show composition. In this section, assume w.l.o.g. that the indices i " 1, . . . , u belong to the group of honest investors and the indices i " u`1, . . . , n belong to the compromised investors. Before showing security, we briefly explain the functionalities used in the proofs. The functionality f Σ is computed by the protocol in Figure 1 . It takes as input n values x 1 , . . . , x n and outputs their sum f Σ px 1 , . . . , x n q " ř n i"1 x i . The functionality f Γ is computed by the protocol in Figure 2 . It takes as input three values com, x, r and outputs 1 iff px, rq is a valid opening for the commitment com. The functionality f Υ is computed by the protocol in Figure 3 . It takes as input two values r, R and outputs 1 iff r is a discrete logarithm of either R or S " R¨g´1 with base h. Figure 1 . immediately follows from the AO security of Σ, which holds by the DDH assumption.
Lemma 4 Let Σ be the protocol in
[ \
Lemma 5
The protocol Γ in Figure 2 securely computes f Γ .
Proof. Assume the honest verifier is corrupted. The simulator S for the view Γ px, K , κq " pK, comq of the verifier can be constructed by choosing a message x 1 , randomness r 1 and outputting the corresponding commitment com 1 . By the perfect hiding property of Γ , the output distribution is indistinguishable from view Γ px, K, κq (
.
Lemma 6
The protocol Υ in Figure 3 securely computes f Υ by the dlog assumption.
Proof. Assume the honest verifier is corrupted and the prover knows the discrete logarithm of either R or S " R¨g´1 base h. We construct a simulator S for the for all i, j, as follows.
5
S takes as input 1 κ , messages x i,j for i " u`1, . . . , n, j " 1, . . . , λ and the protocol outputs
Since we rely on a trusted party to compute fΣ , fΓ , fΥ there is no communication between the group and the coalition. The system administration, which is part of the coalition, and the investors simply feed the trusted party with their according inputs, outputs and received messages to compute the respective functionalities. 6 Since in the context of this lemma we do not care about the linkage property, this can be done efficiently (there are u`λ equations and u¨λ free variables). , r i,j q for all i " 1, . . . , u, j " 1, . . . , q for all i " 1, . . . , u, j " 1, . . . , λ, k "  0 q i"u`1,...,n,j"1,. ..,λ , K, pcom q i"1,...,u,j"1,...,λ,k"0,. ..,l´1 .
The output of S is indistinguishable from the view of the coalition by the perfect hiding property of Γ . 7 The statement of the lemma follows from Lemma 4, Lemma 5, Lemma 6 and Theorem 1.
[ \ Security against malicious investors.
Lemma 8 Investcoin satisfies Property 2 of Definition 4.
A Preservation of Market liquidity
We show that it is still possible to privately exchange any part of an investment between any pair of investors within Investcoin, i.e. market liquidity is unaffected.
Assume that an investment round is over but the returns are not yet executed, i.e. the system already received c i,j , pcom i,j ,c i,j q, C i , D i for all i " 1, . . . , n and j " 1, . . . , λ but not E i , F i . Assume further that for some i, i 1 P t1, . . . , nu, investors N i and N i 1 confidentially agree on a transfer of amount x pi,i 1 q,j (i.e. a part of N i 's investment in project P j ) from investor N i to investor N i 1 . This fact needs to be confirmed by the protocol in order to guarantee the correct returns from project P j to investors N i and N i 1 . Therefore the commitments to the invested amounts x i,j and x i 1 ,j respectively need to be updated. For the update, N i and N i 1 agree on a value r pi,i 1 q,j Ð R r0, ms via secure channel. This value should be known only to N i and N i 1 (between the system and N i 1 ) to ensure that they still commit to amounts ě 0.
